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POVERTY, MIGRATION AND 
ECONOMIC RESILIENCE IN SMALL 
ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES 
John Connell 
Abstract. In some small island developing states (SIDS) income 
distribution is becoming more unequal and poverty concentrated 
in small pockets in urban areas and remote rural areas. Income 
inequality is often exacerbated by and enhanced through urban 
bias and inadequate access to education and health services. Social 
problems have followed. Constraints to trade, other than in some 
services, have resulted in small states emphasising the need for 
migration. International migration has increased in volume and 
range, and, as a result, scarce skills have been lost. However, also 
as a result, remittances have grown substantially (especially in 
the Pacific) and these tended to reduce inequality. The chapter 
will discuss the possible economic benefits of remittances, arguing 
that at the national level the economic future of several small states 
partly hinges on the continued flow of remittances, and hence on 
continuity of migration. In turn this can have a positive effect on 
economic resilience. 
1. Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the changing economic context of small 
island developing states (SIDS), with a particular focus on the Pacific 
region, and on the interrelationships between poverty, migration and 
economic resilience. Many SIDS are isolated and fragmented, with 
numerous populated islands and, in Melanesia, with many distinct 
languages and cultural groups. Prospects for economic growth are 
limited, especially in Polynesia and Micronesia, where no island state 
has a population of more than 250,000. Five island states in the Pacific 
and five elsewhere (two in the Atlantic, two in the Indian Ocean and 
one in the Caribbean) are officially classified as Least Developed 
Countries. Several have been described as failed states; others as highly 
corrupt. Although SIDS in thP Pririfir rPgion rlo not s11ffrr from thP 
absolute depths of poverty experienced in some parts of the developing 
world, including such island states as Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) 
and the Comoros, they have their own social and economic problems 
(Abbott and Pollard, 2004). Generally growing populations have 
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intensified pressure on land. Economic growth has been disappointing 
since independence, granted to many SIDS about thirty years ago, though 
mining and tourism offer prospects in a few cases. This has resulted in a 
series of imposed attempts at restructuring, urged by such institutions 
as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. 
Problems have intensified with the shift from an older reliance on 
commodities towards a more diversified but less protected economy, 
involving the liberalisation of trade and the multinationalisation of 
production. This has been especially challenging for SIDS producing 
sugar and bananas, where effective substitutes have yet to be found, 
and has led to rising unemployment, and even localised trade wars such 
as the "kava-biscuit war" between Vanuatu and Fiji (Connell and Sou tar, 
2007; Connell, 2007a). 
The life courses of island people, present or absent, are increasingly 
embedded in international ties, and many SIDS have sought out new 
migration opportunities. Island states, individuals and various 
international agencies have attached new and increased significance to 
migration, remittance flows, return migration and the role of the 
diaspora, in contexts where" conventional" development strategies have 
achieved limited success. 
Almost all SIDS are characterised by increased emigration, with some 
declining quite rapidly and others (such as Palau) experiencing a positive 
migration flow. Smaller and more vulnerable islands have become more 
evidently peripheral and dependent parts of a wider world, with the 
global shift towards neo-liberalism and free trade. Contemporary 
patterns of migration have diversified, demography has changed, and 
the restructuring of global and island economic landscapes present 
different development contexts. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section, discusses the link 
between poverty and income distribution and delves into the reasons 
for poverty. Section 3 deals with domestic and international migration, 
and the reiated effects of urbanisation, brain and skill drains, and 
remittances. The fourth section discusses the need for a migration policy 
in SIDS followed by a section on the connection between migration and 
resilience building. Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
2. Poverty and Income Distribution 
Most SIDS have limited data on income distribution, either in terms of 
the contemporary situation or as time series data. Where such data exists, 
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these are subject to dispute, partly because of the task of measuring 
incomes in semi-subsistence economies. Formal sector jobs are being 
created more slowly than school-leavers are emerging from the education 
system. The consequence is one of rising unemployment, a growing 
informal sector and visible signs of poverty, especially within urban 
areas. Although poverty is not a welcome word, there is growing 
evidence that it is widespread, sometimes disguised by words such as 
"hardship" (Abbott and Pollard, 2004). Much poverty is also hidden in 
outer islands and remote mountainsides, where there is both a poverty 
of opportunity and minimal access to crucial educational and health 
resources, alongside employment opportunities. One consequence of 
this is sustained rural-urban migration, hence a major task for most states 
is to create employment, and provide services, for outer islands and 
remote places, that would stimulate development and reduce migration 
and thus unmanageable urban growth. 
Reasons for Poverty 
At least in the Pacific, until quite recently, there was a widespread belief 
that poverty did not exist, because of the existence of both urban and 
rural "safety nets" where extended families could and would support 
those who for whatever reason experienced temporary problems. There 
is now evidence that both such safety nets are breaking down and it is 
no longer possible, if it ever were, for urban people simply to return and 
be supported by rural kin (Connell, 2003a: 68-70). In SIDS outside the 
Pacific, poverty has been earlier and sometimes more widely recognised. 
The IMF has produced Poverty Reduction Strategies for many small 
and island states including Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominica, Timor-
Leste (formerly East Timor), Grenada, Haiti and Sao Tome and Principe. 
Timor-Leste has long had high levels of poverty with 42 percent being 
below the poverty line in 1996, and in 1998 Haiti was the poorest country 
in the world with 80 percent of the population living in poverty (World 
Bank, 1998). In Comoros, in 2004, some 37 percent of households were 
classified as being poor, and in Cape Verde some 30 percent of the 
population were poor (and some 14 percent ultra-poor) in 1989 but that 
proportion had risen to 36 percent in 2002. Grenada, regarded as having 
the highest proportion of people in extreme poverty in the Eastern 
Caribbean, had 32 percent in poverty and 5 percent in extreme poverty 
in 2002 (Brown, 2002). 
Absolute poverty is not generally apparent in the Pacific; however some 
households are poor in the sense that they do not have enough food, 
clean water or the resources to enable access to adequate housing, health 
care or basic education (Bryant, 1993). Where data exist, it appears that 
poverty is increasing. In Fiji, for example, one of the few countries to 
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have longitudinal data in the Pacific region, the extent of poverty grew 
significantly between 1975 and 1991 when the Fiji economy was growing 
relatively rapidly. In other words no effectiw trkkl<~down effect was 
occurring, which meant that inequalities were simultaneously increasing. 
Fiji has achieved greater levels of economic growth than most SIDS, hence 
the extent of poverty and inequality could be greater in other places. 
In addition, the extent of poverty in Fiji is now clearly growing, as the 
sugar and manufacturing sectors slump; to the extent that, in terms of 
the government's own data, about one third (34 percent) of all households 
were regarded as being under the poverty line in 2006. Moreover the 
extent of poverty has significantly increased from 9 percent in 1977 and 
25 percent in 1990. 
As the Director of the Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education and 
Advocacy (ECREA) has said: 
"When we look at income distribution and the evidence of 
growing inequality in Fiji in terms of housing, wages, 
education, health care and access to opportunities we must 
admit that we are in danger of creating and accepting in 
Fiji -the Fiji of the rich, which belongs to a small number 
of elite and the Fiji for the poor, which belongs to a vast 
majority who are struggling to keep their heads above 
water." (Fiji Times, 17 September 2006). 
Poverty and income inequality exist for various reasons. Most island 
economies are weak and have tended to be further weakened through 
recent processes of globalisation. Low levels of investment, political 
instability, corruption and failures of governance worsen existing 
situations, as do natural hazards. In some states this has resulted in a 
downward spiral-an urban "poverty trap" from which there appears 
little hope of improvement. 
A parallel downward spiral may also be occurring in rural areas where 
young people choose not to enter the agricultural sector but, despite 
high urban unemployment, move in search of urban jobs (which their 
limited education often denies them), resulting in a large proportion of 
uncultivated land, low productivity and loss of traditional knowledge 
and techniques. Single parent households and those with disabilities 
are commonly relatively poor (though many single parent households 
in the Pacific actually depend relatively successfully on the remittnnccs 
of distant males) as are those where there is functional or real illiteracy, 
and bear the primary burdens of poverty. Furthermore in many SIDS 
there is growing evidence of" chronic intergenerational poverty" (Brown, 
2002) as the downward spiral remains in place. 
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A number of outcomes of poverty and income inequality are manifested 
by inadequate housing, limited access to clean water, low education 
lt>vt>ls, t>spe.cially post-primary education, and inadequate health 
services, thus tending to perpetuate the structural context of poverty. 
Urban areas are growing faster than the rate of overall population 
growth, and informal settlements are growing particularly quickly, as 
the supply of land and formal housing is inadequate to meet the needs 
of new migrants (or even established residents). In larger cities like 
Suva, settlements house more than half the urban population: a result 
of rural-urban migration precipitated by the demand for services 
(especially education), the expiry of land leases and the breakdown of 
extended families. 
Urban Poverty 
Many urban poor live in settlements, and socio-economic inequalities are 
most evident in urban areas. Those who are poorest are those with little 
support from the rural economy and no opportunity to move away from 
town when poverty, rising unemployment, old age or social disorders 
make life difficult. In settlements such as Blacksands, Vila (Vanuatu) 
insecurity over land tenure and employment meant that migrants often 
contemplated return migration but usually chose to remain for their 
children's sake. Most households in Blacksands had incomes below the 
national average and at least a quarter had problems meeting school fees, 
paying rents and providing food. Most supplemented their cash incomes 
from subsistence food gardens (Mecartney, 2001), an option not always 
open to settlement residents. Low incomes and a lack of support during 
illness or unemployment give a sense of biding time, waiting for 
unforeseen and uncertain opportunities and sometimes securing multiple 
jobs, maintaining strict budgets and abandoning some "traditional" 
obligations, simply to get by. Many urban residents survive rather than 
prosper in the city (Connell and Lea, 2002). 
One consequence of urban growth being in excess of urban job creation 
is the steady emergence of the informal sector, with particularly rapid 
growth being in prostitution and the rise of crime. In Suva, Honiara, 
Port Vila and elsewhere, the rise of urban poverty and the informal sector 
has been marked by new repressions of the poor and marginallsed, in 
diverse anti-urban policies, as they are forced out of urban areas, most 
dramatically by the bulldozing of settlements, and by attempts to devolve 
sol11tions to thr C'h11ff'hPs from thP stntP, mthrr th;m by conC'Prte.d 01ttempts 
to devise welfare, employment or rural development policies that might 
reduce such problems (Koczberski et al., 2001). Pervasive opposition to 
urbanisation has delayed and discouraged the development of coordinated 
plans for urban management, and hence the reduction of urban 
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development problems. Ironically there is no evidence that it has slowed 
rural-urban migration. Even urban markets and market vendors have 
been opposed by urban ;md national governments, despite their ability to 
provide substantial employment for both youths and women. Social 
disorganisation and crime are a function of substantial inequalities in 
access to land, housing and other services. 
Archipelagic populations have become increasingly concentrated on the 
more central urbanised islands, accentuating problems of service delivery 
in remote areas, in turn accounting for further movement away from 
isolated areas and the slow depopulation of smaller, remote islands. 
Unemployment is most visible amongst urban youth (Abbott and Pollard, 
2004), and there is growing recognition of the existence of significant 
numbers of unemployed and marginalised youth in most towns, such as 
Port Vila (Mitchell, 2004), the small Tongan towns of Neiafu and also 
Nuku'alofa (Gailey, 1992b). Poverty is also hidden in outer islands, where 
there is both a poverty of opportunity and minimal access to crucial 
educational and health resources, alongside employment opportunities 
(Connell, 2003a; 2006a). This, in turn, has stimulated emigration. Towns 
are seedbeds of discontent and provide incentives to further migration, 
but amongst those least able to achieve, or gain, from it. 
Urban poverty bears some relationship to internal migration since the 
urban poor are often those who have migrated from the most 
impoverished and remote rural areas. People are thus moving away from 
rural poverty, in the sense of inadequate access to employment and 
income-earning activities, and towards services, yet migration tends to 
transfer poverty to urban areas. Migration is embedded in this very broad 
context, which takes minimal note of either substantial or subtle regional 
variations. 
A Population Context? 
All small island states within the Pacific region are going through, or 
have experienced, the demographic transition hence the "doomsday 
syndrome" -with explosive population growth rates - that was forecast 
a decade ago in the Pacific, did not materialise. Nonetheless population 
growth rates in the Pacific region remain relatively high in a few states, 
even with high levels of outmigration. 
Life expectancies have risen over th0 pnst q11nrt0r of n c0nt11ry, hnt r0mnin 
relatively low in the Melanesian. A critical development issue is that of 
maintaining, let alone improving, present standards of living in the face 
of continued population increase, the absence of effective population 
policies and minimal economic growth. 
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Developing and implementing population policies has proved difficult 
in most SIDS. The factors that are most conducive to successful 
population policies - integration of population and development 
policies, improved rural development and communications to spread 
new values and reduce the use of children in production, and formal 
sector employment opportunities for women of increasing age of 
marriage - are largely absent. 
The outcome of high population growth rates has been that in most states 
there is a preponderance of young adults in the population, a situation 
that has placed strains on land resources, but also on employment 
markets, education and social organisation. The phenomenon of a /1 youth 
bulge", where a high proportion of the population is both youthful and 
unemployed, is becoming increasingly visible and problematic in many 
SIDS, where formal job opportunities are few. 
In certain localised contexts, population pressure on resources has 
created tensions, where land is not freely available, but zealously guarded 
by its traditional owners. In the Solomon Islands quite recent conflicts 
around Honiara were partly a consequence of Malaitans leaving their 
own densely populated island and settling on the land of the local 
Guadalcanal population who resented the loss of their resources - and 
the greater competition for scarce urban jobs (Connell, 2006b). More 
broadly it has been argued that there is a possible correlation between 
recent political tensions in the Melanesian region (Fiji, Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands) since migration from these countries is limited or non-
existent in contrast to Polynesian and Micronesian states, where 
migration has been considerable and political stability much greater 
(Ware, 2005). However other crucial realities suggest that the relationship 
between migration, population pressure on resources and political 
tensions is much more complex. 
3. Urbanisation and International Migration 
Migration is a response to real and perceived inequalities in 
socioeconomic opportunities, within and between states. Social 
influences are important, especially in terms of access to education and 
health services, and are in turn often a function of economic issues. 
Environmental hazards and degradation may be catalysts. Expectations 
huve risen over w hul conslilules u sulisfudory slunJurJ of living, a 
desirable occupation and a suitable mix of accessible services and 
amenities. Employment crises, growing populations, inflation, static (or 
even falling) commodity prices and the declining availability of land in 
some areas, slowly increase the gap between expectation and reality, at 
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the same time as it becomes more visible. Agricultural work has lost 
prestige and the relatively limited and declining participation of young 
men in the agricultural economy is ubiquitous. Changes in values, 
following increased educational opportunities and the expansion of 
bureaucratic (largely urban) employment usually from the 1970s, the 
period when many island states became independent, have further 
oriented migration streams outwards, as local employment opportunities 
have not kept pace with population growth. 
Urban Migration 
Urban migration has led to national populations becoming increasingly 
concentrated on the more central urbanised islands, and this has become 
a vicious circle accentuating and accounting for further movement away 
from isolated areas. Migration is always selective. The more educated 
have tended to migrate first and migrants have left many rural areas to 
take advantage of superior urban educational and employment 
opportunities, as in Blacksands settlement, Port Vila, Vanuatu 
(Mecartney, 2001). Earning power is increasingly concentrated amongst 
urban bureaucracies while the absence of developed state mechanisms 
(such as progressive taxation, unemployment benefits and pension 
schemes) for affecting transfers of income minimises redistribution 
towards rural areas other than through remittances. Growing 
inequalities, coupled with rising expectations, are the concomitants of 
increased migration. 
Economic issues are critical but not the only influences on migration, 
especially where small islands have limited social, educational and 
medical facilities. Many migrate for their children's educational and 
employment future (Connell, 2006b). Political factors have also been 
significant influences in various contexts, notably in the migration from 
Fiji that followed the 1987 and 2000 coups, and in the skilled migration 
from Bougainville, Fiji and the Solomon Islands during the recent crises. 
In Fiji, migration was not only of ethnic Indians, arguably the most 
affected by the coups, but also of ethnic Fijians, emphasising how 
migration could be seen as "a barometer of fear" of further conflict 
(Narayan and Smyth, 2003). Environmental factors have similarly 
influenced migration with significant recent movement from Montserrat, 
where half the population left in the aftermath of the eruption of Mount 
Soufriere in the mid-1990s (Philpott, 1999), from the Carteret Islands in 
Papua New Guinea, where localiseJ sea level rise and erosion has posed 
particular problems (Connell, 1990), and from Manam (Papua New 
Guinea) and the northern islands of the Marianas, following volcanic 
eruptions. Cyclone Heta, that devastated Niue in January 2004 destroying 
almost a quarter of the houses on the island, even prompted some 
270 
Poverty, Migration and Economic Resilience 
thoughts about the permanent abandonment of the island, as had 
Cyclone Ofa two decades earlier (Barker, 2000). Earlier eruptions 
temporarily depopulated Tristan da Cunha. Global warming poses a 
future threat to the islands, and especially to over a hundred populated 
coral atolls, should sea level rise occur. In Tuvalu, fears are such that 
emigration has already occurred in anticipation of new difficulties to 
follow (Connell, 2003b). Island states are in no position financially, 
geographically or politically, to defend themselves against such potential 
threats, but if-perhaps when - the worst does occur, then islanders may 
become a new stream of environmental refugees to metropolitan states. 
Yet, ultimately, an economic rationale, real or latent, may underly most 
migration moves. Simply stated, in Port Vila, one of the most important 
reasons was "bilong winim smol vatu bikos i no gat rod long winim 
vatu long aelan (to earn a little money since there is no way to earn 
money on the home island)" (Mitchell, 2000: 172). For many that is reason 
enough. Growing inequalities, coupled with rising expectations, are the 
concomitants of increased migration. Within the larger Melanesian states 
remittances from urban to rural areas continue to play an important 
role, especially where migration is from small islands. Even for remote 
parts of such large islands as Tanna, Vanuatu, remittances from urban 
migrants are the single largest source of income in several villages 
(Winthorpe, 2004). Experiences and perceptions of the wider world, its 
values, and its material rewards further underlie the migratory 
experience. 
International Migration 
In most SIDS, outmigration first became significant in the 1960s with 
the "long boom", rising demand for labour in metropolitan states, jet air 
travel and cheaper fares. Within a decade of that boom smaller island 
states, such as Niue, were already losing population and moving towards 
a" culture of migration" where migration was normative and central to 
island life (Connell, 2007a). Migration gradually became an expected 
and accepted phenomenon, an integral strand in both household and 
national concepts of development and a semi-permanent safety valve, 
not for population growth but for weak local and national economies 
(Connell and King, 1999). 
In the present century, migration has taken new forms in the wake of 
3lohnl Pronomk shifts TntPrnntionnl miwntion hns hPromP morf' skill-
selective and the "brain-drain" increasingly exemplifies patterns of 
migration from islands, whether of nurses, airline pilots or footballers, 
and women are now a key component of migration. Whereas early 
migration tended to follow colonial, post-colonial and linguistic ties, it 
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has become gradually more global. Remittances have played a more 
important role as the economic gains from migration have taken 
precedence, and commodification of labour has become more apparent, 
especially in new pressures from many island states to negotiate 
migration ties with metropolitan states, as part of a new" outward urge". 
Underpinned by economic forces, an increasing gap between well-being 
in SIDS and metropolitan states has stimulated migration. Experiences 
and perceptions of the wider world, its values, and its material rewards 
further underlie the migratory experience, and in an electronic era, 
knowledge of distant places is less fragmentary. In many places (Connell, 
2007a; Carling, 2002), migration is perceived as an appropriate and 
legitimate means to economic and social well-being, rather than a rupture 
or discontinuity with island experiences. 
Since the 1960s, there has been accelerated migration from island states, 
as islanders began to seek employment and access to services in the 
metropolitan states. For the smallest places, including the Cook Islands, 
Niue, Tokelau, Anguilla, Montserrat and Pitcairn, migration has been 
particularly pronounced as a majority of the indigenous population now 
live overseas. St Kitts, Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands have 
experienced declining populations over the past quarter of a century, 
while it has long been forecast that the smallest populated entity, Pitcairn, 
may simply disappear as its population falls below a sustainable level 
(Connell, 1988). Niue has sought immigration from Tuvalu, as its 
population has recently declined sharply in the wake of Cyclone Heta 
and due to a long term "culture of migration" (Connell, 2007a). Even 
relatively larger states, such as Samoa and Tonga, have experienced very 
limited population growth as emigration has become something of a 
"safety valve" for high population growth rates (Ware, 2005). 
A few islands have experienced depopulation in recent times, such as 
Merir (Palau) where one observer recorded its final phases: "The island 
is dying, at least as far as the present generations are concerned ... The 
women are too old to cultivate taro in any quantity, and the men cannot 
keep the taro groves cleared" (Osborne, 1966: 49). But this is unusual. 
Other tiny island populations, such as that of Pitcairn, have survived 
long after their demise was predicted (Connell, 1988). Niue has a resident 
population of 1500, but there are 5328 Niue-born in New Zealand and 
more than 500 elsewhere, alongside their dependents (Connell, 2008). 
Such extremes of Jepopulalion are however exceptional. By contrast, Cl 
few dependent territories, notably the United States Virgin Islands, the 
British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos in the Caribbean, Guam, 
the Northern Marianas and American Samoa in the Pacific, and Mayotte 
in the Indian Ocean, have become stepping stones for onward migration 
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to affluent metropolitan states, usually the United States. In each of these 
islands, population growth has usually been very rapid. Extensive 
subsidies have turned these and other dependent islands, such as Niue, 
Norfolk Island, Christmas Island, Britain's south Atlantic territories, and 
St Pierre and Miquelon in the north Atlantic (Royle, 2001: 89-90) into 
"government islands" where public service employment enables a 
prosperity and population stability that would be more difficult 
elsewhere. Here and in many other islands, migration is the principal 
regulator of demographic change. 
In the past decade, new patterns of skilled migration have taken nurses 
from Fiji to a diversity of destinations, from the Marshall Islands and 
Palau to New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates (Rokoduru, 2008; 
Connell, 2004), and took rugby players beyond the "traditional" 
destinations of New Zealand and Australia to Japan and the United 
Kingdom. In the Caribbean, Aruban nurses go to Curacao, Cuban nurses 
and doctors to several states and Jamaican nurses to Bermuda; many go 
on to Canada, the United States and the Netherlands (Connell, 2007a). 
Active recruitment has emphasised this process (Connell and Stilwell, 
2006). Even newer movements have become particularly important in 
the last couple of years, with migration from Fiji and Tonga to the Middle 
East (Iraq, Kuwait and also Sudan), emphasising the manner in which 
new and highly paid overseas employment opportunities are being 
firmly grasped, even in an unappealing and violent security and social 
context, and have quickly turned Fiji into a major recipient of remittances 
alongside Tonga (Connell, 2006a). Simultaneously, islands where 
migration was of relatively slight importance barely a decade ago, have 
become highly dependent upon it. The former US territories of 
Micronesia - the now independent states of Palau, the Federated States 
of Micronesia and particularly the Marshall Islands - are becoming 
increasingly similar to other Pacific islands: a steady outflow, growth of 
relatively permanent urban communities overseas (beyond student 
groups), the return flow of remittances and growing interest in 
migration). Nowhere does the demand for migration appear to be 
decelerating. 
In recent years, migration opportunities in metropolitan states have 
however tended to decline, and are increasingly targeted at skilled 
migrants, rather than family reunions. Thus migration flows from the 
Caribbean and Pacific are increasingly likely to be of skilled migrants from 
vnrious sectors including health (Connell, 2004; 2007a; 2008) and education 
(Voigt-Graf, 2003). Structural changes within metropolitan states have 
meant that certain sectors, notably health, are short of skilled workers. 
Island nurses, usually entering the bottom levels of the "global health 
care chain", have migrated much greater distances, as demand intensifies. 
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In the past, male migration usually preceded female or family migration 
from most islands, especially where plantation labour was required, but 
preferences have firmly shifted towards women. In many cases, families 
migrate as units, often as skilled migrants on the basis of one spouse's 
qualifications. Some specific occupational categories are either male or 
female dominated. For instance, Fijian women have migrated as nurses, 
domestic helpers and care-givers while Fijian men have moved overseas 
as soldiers, tourism workers, police, pilots and employees of private 
security companies (Voigt-Graf and Connell, 2006). There are however 
real disadvantages associated with this, both in terms of the loss of skills 
to Fiji and circumstances where more than a dozen workers have been 
killed in the Middle East. More generally, the demand for service sector 
workers, in areas from domestic service to tourism, information 
technology and health, has shifted the balance in favour of women, 
particularly in the Caribbean, though women migrants are most likely 
to be exploited (Ferguson, 2003: 16). 
Interest in migration has long been such that in Samoa, when prospects 
for emigration were particularly poor at the start of the 1980s, the "broken 
dreams" of potential migrants contributed to a significant rise in youth 
suicide (Macpherson and Macpherson, 1987). At a national level, the 
economic future of several states partly hinges on the continued flow of 
remittances, and hence on some continuity of migration (Ahlburg, 1991; 
Connell and Brown, 1995; World Bank, 2006). 
The possibility of blocked migration in the future, a situation ever present 
in public debate (Macpherson, 1992; Shankman, 1993), emphasises the 
potential problem of a high rate of natural increase in the event that 
emigration is substantially reduced, especially as a" culture of migration" 
becomes established. Thus in recent years, migration has become more 
complex, globalisation has extended the number of destinations and 
brought longer migration chains, migration has become more selective, 
but also in greater demand, and part of that selectivity has favoured the 
migration of women. 
Brain and Skill Drains 
The proportion of skilled islanders among all migrants is increasing, as 
a result of shortages in the receiving countries, some of which- as with 
the health services of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United 
States-have led to private sector recruitment (Connell and Stilwell, 
2006). Low remuneration, poor promotion opportunities, limited training 
and further educational opportunities, poor working and living 
conditions, particularly in remote regions, are push factors for skilled 
migrants (Connell, 2007c; 2008). The growing shortage of skilled workers 
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has also contributed to increased inter-island migration, with workers 
migrating to countries offering better work conditions and salaries, such 
as Fijian teachers migrating to the Marshall Islands, and Fijian tourism 
workers moving to the Cook Islands. This international and regional 
brain-drain has become excessive in some small states, though ironically 
many migrants become part of a "brain loss" or "brain-waste" because 
their qualifications, despite gaining them entry, are unrecognised in the 
destination. At the same time, illegal migration of less skilled migrants 
has occurred. There are many illegal Fijian and various Polynesian 
overstayers in the United States (Scott, 2003), Australia and New Zealand, 
Cape Verdeans in the United States and France (Carling, 2002), and 
Caribbean islanders in more developed Caribbean states, Canada and 
the United States. 
The loss of skilled labour has been a serious issue for several island states, 
but perhaps especially for some of the smallest, who only need, but have, 
few skilled workers. Emigration rates of skilled persons have steadily 
increased in the PICs, particularly as overseas recruitment occurs, and 
especially for health workers. New Zealand, the UAE and other countries, 
for instance, have actively recruited nurses from Fiji. Consequently there 
is a shortage of skilled health practitioners in almost all Pacific and 
Caribbean island states (Connell, 2007c; 2008). Even in larger states like 
Fiji, the loss is significant and problematic. Doctors are twice as likely to 
migrate as nurses because wage differentials are greater, and because most 
nurses are women and men are often the primary decision makers 
regarding migration (Brown and Connell, 2004). However female Fijian 
nurses frequently took the decision to migrate autonomously, often leaving 
their husbands and children behind, mainly for higher wages, but 
alongside escaping marriage problems and customary obligations 
(Rokoduru, 2008). Because of smaller numbers and greater training costs, 
the loss of doctors (and other specialists) is most critical. There is an acute 
shortage of doctors and nurses in Fiji, exacerbated in the wake of the 2000 
coups and by the active recruitment of some receiving countries, and the 
Ministry of Health has had to recruit doctors from the Philippines and the 
Indian subcontinent to fill the gaps (Chandra, 2003). 
In some smaller states the brain drain has been equally worrying; the 
Cook Islands, for example, lost more than half its vocationally qualified 
population in the single decade 1966-76 and much the same happened 
again in the mid-1990s when the national economy collapsed (Connell, 
2005). Many islands and island states now also experience a shortage of 
airline pilots, accountants, engineers, IT workers and other skilled 
groups. Even tiny Niue has had to import refrigeration and other 
engineers from the Philippines because of its losses of human capital to 
migration (Connell, 2007a). Skilled migration is unlikely to decrease, 
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given worsening skilled worker shortages in the" standard" destinations, 
and increased shortages in newer, more distant markets. 
Changing aspirations and the migration of the more educated young 
contribute to the brain and skill drain from SIDS, perhaps ultimately 
worsening the welfare and bargaining position of those places. In small 
island states, it is unusually difficult to replace skilled migrants, both 
because of the duration of training that is required and the very small 
demand for some particular skills. The outcome in the health sector at 
least is that basic needs are less well satisfied, especially in more remote 
areas, and there is a loss of morale amongst those who have remained, 
as working conditions deteriorate. Wards are closed, waiting lists and 
times lengthen, examinations are more cursory, or complicated by new 
cultural differences, and large proportions of budgets are directed to 
referrals to distant places (Connell, 2004). The shift to skilled migration, 
despite remittances, has been at some cost to service provision in many 
islands and island states, but it is unlikely to decrease, given the 
significance of skilled worker shortages in each of the "standard" 
destinations, and increased shortages in newer, more distant markets. 
Return migration has not solved labour shortage problems and small states 
including Fiji and the Cook Islands have turned towards Asian labour 
markets for replacements (Connell, 2005). In the case of migration of 
Tongans and Samoans to the United States alone, "Emigration results in 
the permanent loss of young educated skilled labour from the Pacific island 
nations. Skilled labour is in short supply and emigration probably hinders 
development" (Ahlburg and Levin, 1990: 84). This is certainly true more 
generally in the health sector, where more costly (and sometimes less 
skilled) replacements have sometimes been required, and in sports. 
However nurses at least send very high levels of remittances, sustained 
over long periods of time, to the extent that their remittances are almost 
certainly substantially above the training costs (Brown and Connell, 2004). 
At the same time more nurses are joining the profession because it provides 
migration opportunities, hence some Pacific and Caribbean states are 
moving towards the situation in the Philippines where nurses are 
effectively trained to be migrants. This suggests that the economic costs 
of skilled migration are not as great as has been feared, even if training is 
in the public sector and remittances are private, but it is impossible to 
accurately cost the health disadvantages of high levels of emigration. 
Remittances 
Migration decisions are usually shaped within a family context, as 
migrants leave to meet certain family expectations. Migration has rarely 
been an individual decision, nor has it been dictated by national interests 
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(except perhaps in the case of Kiribati and Tuvalu), but is directed at 
improving the living standards of those who remain at home and the 
lifestyle and income of the migrants. Consequently, as in Tonga," families 
deliberate carefully about which members would be most likely to do 
well overseas and be reliable in sending remittances" (Gailey, 1992b: 
465), and extended households have transformed themselves into 
"transnational corporations of kin" which strategically allocate family 
labour to local and overseas destinations to maximise income 
opportunities, minimise risk, and benefit from resultant remittance flows 
(Marcus, 1981). While this form of household consensus certainly occurs, 
and demonstrates the significance of access to the migration-remittances 
nexus, families are not always in agreement about their economic aims 
and functions, and there are often conflicts and tensions within them 
(Morton Lee, 2004: 136; Connell, 2006a). Nonetheless, for households in 
Samoa, "having young wage earners abroad diversified families" 
earnings streams and reduced their dependence on high-risk activities. 
Having family members in several locations abroad diversified earning 
sources and reduced risk levels still further"; moreover "If this analysis 
depicts Samoans as calculative and instrumental, it is because in relation 
to risk and return they are necessarily so ... [as] risks and returns available 
in various places were formally canvassed and modeled by families" 
(Macpherson, 2004: 168). While this form of household consensus 
certainly occurs, and demonstrates the significance of access to the 
migration-remittances nexus, there are household uncertainties about 
outcomes in various places. 
Over a decade ago, James (1993: 361) argued that in many Tongan villages 
remittances were becoming individualised and that the idea of a 
transnational community of kin was becoming increasingly invalid (see 
also Morton Lee, 2003: 31). The extent of greater individualisation is 
however impossible to determine, but increased conflicts over the 
allocation and use of remittances emphasise, rather than downplay, their 
growing role. 
In many countries, remittances form a significant part of disposable 
income, hence by the 1980s smaller Pacific island states (initially Kiribati, 
Tokelau, Cook Islands and Tuvalu) had become conceptualised as 
MIRAB states, where Migration, Remittances, Aid and the resultant 
largely urban Bureaucracy are central to the socio-economic system 
(Bertram and Watters, 1985). The notion of MIRAB is also applicable in 
larger states such as Cape Verde, Samoa and Tonga, where remittances 
constitute some of the highest proportions of GNP in the world and in 
many similar contexts within the Caribbean and Pacific, now including 
Fiji, where remittances are the single most important source of national 
income (Connell and Conway, 2000). 
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Recent events in Fiji emphasise the expanding "outward urge", the 
crucial role of remittances and the growing significance of MIRAB. While 
the acronym is disliked in the Pacific, for cultural reasons and because 
of its implication of a "handout mentality", it nonetheless suggests the 
centrality of migration and remittances in islands and island states, and 
has been largely unchallenged for two decades (Bertram, 1986; 1999; 
2006; Connell and Brown, 2005; Brown and Connell, 2006). There is no 
question that it has similar validity in other SIDS. 
Remittances are particularly important in smaller states and more remote 
islands where conventional economic development is difficult. Thus for 
the tiny coral atoll of Manihiki (Cook Islands), migration and the resultant 
remittances are so crucial that they constitute nothing less than a socio-
economic strategy for collective survival (Underhill, 1989). In Nanumea 
in Tuvalu remittances grew from being about half of the island income 
in the 1970s and 1980s to some 75 percent in the 1990s, largely because 
of the collapse of copra marketing as world prices slumped (Chambers 
and Chambers, 2001: 156). Similar situations occur in other small islands 
and island states, and the northern Micronesian states are now following 
this pattern (Connell and Brown, 2005: 6). 
Conventional wisdom suggests that remittances are overwhelmingly 
used for consumption and inadequate amounts are directed towards 
investment. However there are both alternative perceptions over the 
use of remittances and issues of fungibility-where the specific use of 
remittances cannot easily be distinguished from other spending patterns 
and may distort them (Connell and Brown, 2005). After debt repayment, 
new forms of consumption-which are important-housing and some 
community goals (such as water tanks and churches), air fares and 
education (an investment in social capital), remittances are used for 
investment, sometimes in the agricultural sector but more frequently in 
the service sector, and especially into stores and transport businesses. 
In Samoa and elsewhere, remittance money has constituted the start-up 
money for many shopkeepers and other small entrepreneurs. Half of all 
market vendors in Apia (Samoa), all of whom received remittances, 
claimed that some had been used as capital for the purchase of seeds, 
fertiliser and tools to engage in food production for sale (Muliaina, 2001: 
28), while the expansion of the Nuku'alofa flea market in Tonga since 
the mid-1980s followed households using remittances as an investment 
in their market stalls, and subsequent economic diversification (Brown 
and Connell, 1993). 
Even in the most difficult circumstances, remittance recipients make 
efforts to invest where they can. In the outer islands of Kiribati, where 
most remittances went into providing basic needs, and the custom of 
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bubuti (a request that cannot be refused) makes savings let alone business 
almost impossible, all recipients nevertheless sought to retain some 
income to invest in land purchase, doughnut bakeries, stores or even in 
sewing material for blouses that might later be sold (Borovnik, 2004). 
Similarly on a small outer island, like Falahola (Tonga), remittances have 
been used for economic ventures, ranging from agriculture to tourism, 
though remoteness has limited their success (James, 1991:18-20). 
Throughout Tonga, the increased use of remittances for investment 
purposes, in fishing, agriculture, stores and transport businesses, attests 
to the shift from consumption to investment (Faeamani, 1995; Walker 
and Brown, 1995). This transition has also occurred in Caribbean SIDS 
(Connell and Conway, 2000) and elsewhere. Where there are 
opportunities, and where consumption goals have been satisfied, 
remittances are used for investment, stimulate entrepreneurial and 
trading activity, increase the extent of formal sector employment and 
produce multiplier effects. However, while this transition benefits 
economic development, it emphasises intra-village (and island) economic 
inequalities and may hamper social development. 
The use and structure of remittances have changed over time, with 
significant intergenerational shifts in the structure of remittances. Initially 
remittances are sent to parents and, in an economic sense, constitute 
repayment for their past investment in the human capital of the migrant; 
in a social sense this is usually expressed as duty, loyalty and 
maintenance of family ties. Even with imperfect knowledge, households 
consciously make decisions in favour of the quantity and quality of 
education of children that boost their chances for migration and thus 
remittances (Brown and Connell, 2004; 2006). A second wave of 
remittances is more likely to be dominated by brothers and sisters and 
by children; this phase may also correspond with a decline in volume, 
but represents an investment in the human capital of the next generation 
(Brown and Poirine, 2005). The third and final phase represents payments 
to spouses - and indirectly (via investment) to the remitters themselves, 
as return migration and/ or retirement are approached. 
Because of the continued and increasing significance of remittances, the 
sustainability of remittance-dependent development is particularly 
important but necessarily uncertain. Even with continued migration, 
however, an anticipated imbalance is likely to occur because of the 
dynamics of settlement migration. Though data on Tongan and Samoan 
nurses in Australia indicate that even skilled migrants sustain remittance 
levels at high levels and over long time periods (Brown and Connell, 
2004), circumstances change. With family reunification and greater 
integration of migrants in host communities, the ability and willingness 
to remit should decline over time. Links with second-generation migrants 
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become more tenuous as these new generations act as individuals rather 
than perceive themselves as members of wider transnational social 
groupings. This is particularly so where migration opportunities decline 
and the number of overseas born "islanders" becomes the majority. As 
overseas generations lose language and cultural skills, or "marry out", 
their sense of belonging declines, and without renewed migration island 
futures are less certain (Connell, 2006a). At the very least remittances 
have complex and important social and economic dimensions. 
There is no consensus on whether remittances improve or worsen income 
distribution. Until relatively recently the dominant view was that 
remittances tended to reinforce income inequality, by enhancing the 
capacity of recipient households to invest in additional migration, 
education and other income-generating assets (Connell, 1980; Shankman, 
1993). 
Some village studies have both demonstrated considerable income 
inequality (Hardaker et al., 1987) and suggested that this is partly a 
result of remittance flows (Gailey, 1992a; Small, 1997: 134, 195). It is 
certainly a widespread perception; Marcus (1993: 29-30) thus suggested 
that" the capacity to call on international resources has become a crucial 
factor in influencing a family's local economic conditions. The lowest 
stratum in contemporary Tonga are those totally dependent on the 
nation-state framework, and the limited resources it embodies, without 
any overseas options at all". Indeed it is increasingly argued, as in 
Tonga, that" every family needs to have someone overseas. Otherwise 
the family is to be pitied" (quoted in Small, 1997: 152). Hence, in contrast 
to western societies, it is often the single-female headed households 
that survive most effectively (Gailey, 1992a). However more recent 
empirical studies based on survey data have tended to challenge this 
view, and some macroeconomic data suggest that remittances have 
not led to increased inter-household income inequality, at least within 
Tonga (Ahlburg, 1991). 
Ahlburg (1991, 1995) and Connell and Brown (1995) found that the 
distribution of household income with remittances was less skewed than 
the distribution without remittances, while other recent studies have 
indicated that inequality is a function of many factors of which the 
migration-remittance nexus may be an unimportant or tiny part (Evans, 
2001; Muliaina, 2001; Halatuituia, 2001). The most recent studies of 
migration and remittances in Tonga and Fiji have shown that those 
households with migrants were more likely to have a higher income, 
independent of remittances, but the direction of causality was unclear 
(Brown and Connell, 2006). A consensus in very diverse circumstances 
is improbable. 
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4. The Need for Migration Policy 
Although no SIDS have sought to discourage international migration in 
recent years, several have expressed particular concerns, mainly attached 
to the loss of skilled labour, the breaching of bonds by scholarship holders 
or, as in the case of Niue, particularly extensive migration. 
Fiji is one country where there have been serious concerns over some 
impacts of migration, even though the Fiji Government once tended to 
regard emigrants as" traitors" and some policies effectively punish return 
migrants - for example where migrant nurses have to start on a lower 
salary on re-employment in Fiji compared to before migration 
(Rokoduru, 2008). While this policy discourages the temporary migration 
of nurses, it also discourages return migration in a sector where there 
are acute shortages. More recently however Fiji has sought out overseas 
migration opportunities. In 2004 the government finalised contracts for 
migrant workers to go to Kuwait. 
Several countries have trained workers for overseas employment, as is 
the case, for example, with the Marine Training Schools of Tuvalu and 
Kiribati. Kiribati itself has sought to extend the seaman programme to 
cover nurses, and both Tonga and Samoa would like to train more 
professionals than can be employed locally (Ware, 2005: 445-446), and 
benefit from presumably superior remittance flows. This shift to the 
deliberate export of skilled workers has major potential ramifications 
for development. 
On several occasions Tuvalu has drawn attention to the particular 
difficulties of sustaining populations in a small, densely populated island 
state, with few resources, alongside the problems of absorbing return 
migrants (Connell, 2003b: 94-5). 
Several Pacific island states have recently requested Australia for 
guestworker positions in agriculture (Connell, 2006c), along the lines of 
earlier schemes negotiated between Fiji and New Zealand (Levick and 
Bedford, 1988). Once concerned over the costs of migration, islanders, 
from individuals and households to extended families and national 
governments, are increasingly likely to seek out new opportunities. 
It appears therefore that within SIDS, there is some ambivalence towards 
mi3rntinn ThPrP is thPrPforp thf' nf'f'cl for ri clf'cir migrntion policy in 
SIDS, a policy that attempts to maximise the benefits and minimise the 
drawbacks of migration. In particular there is the need for a policy to 
channel remittances more effectively into investment for the promotion 
of economic development. 
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5. Migration and Economic Resilience 
There is little doubt that migration has provided new and welcome 
development opportunities for small island states, at village and national 
level. Pragmatism has overwhelmed intellectual doubts. Opportunities 
are eagerly sought after. While many migrants are indeed within the 
disadvantaged secondary sector of metropolitan labour markets, and 
many have been deskilled during migration, they have accepted 
outcomes that, however disappointing, may well be superior to what 
has been left behind. 
At a national level the economic future of several states partly hinges on 
the continued flow of remittances, and hence on continuity of migration 
(Ahlburg, 1991; Carling, 2002; Connell and Brown, 1995). This reality 
may enhance the economic resilience of the recipient small states. There 
is evidence from cross-country studies to suggest that remittance flows 
are more stable than foreign direct investment and official development 
assistance (IMF, 2005). These flows can have the effect of a hedge against 
economic shocks. 
There is room for some degree of optimism that remittance flows will 
not decline significantly in the near future, but alongside pessimism that 
this will not continue indefinitely, especially for non-migrant generations. 
That conclusion depends in large part on the continuity of migration 
flows. But if opportunities decline, and if, as Muliaina (2001: 20) has 
argued in the context of Samoa, there is a continued tightening of 
immigration policies in major Samoan destinations, for whatever reason, 
"the standard of living of rural Samoans, as opposed to urban dwellers, 
may be expected to decline in the next decade". Such longer term costs 
remain uncertain. 
6. Conclusion 
In a globalised world, Pacific SIDS face uncertain times. Uneven 
development between SIDS and metropolitan states, and within the SIDS, 
is unlikely to decrease. Whilst poverty is readily evident in most states, 
not all governments recognise its existence. At a local level more 
successful development, but on a small-scale, has involved a degree of 
hybridity between local social structures and introduced economic 
structures, a persistent indication that people live in societies and not 
economies (Connell, 2007d). 
The rhetoric and intermittent practice of self reliance, at national and 
household levels, has disguised a situation in which there has been a 
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growing dependence on external sources of funding, whether from aid, 
remittances or investment. This has, in part, contributed to new forms 
of socio-economic inequality in countries and especially in cities, and 
incipient class formation, though ethnic and regional divisions and 
traditional power structures are of pervasive importance. International 
migration has deferred and mitigated, but not resolved, issues of poverty 
and of development. 
While accelerated national and international migration has been partly 
a response to the collapse of commodity markets and the inability to 
effectively diversify domestic economies, it has nonetheless long been 
an effective strategy for economic diversification. The creation of new 
diasporas has spread economic risk beyond small nations, and resulted 
in a considerable dependence on remittances, but has sheltered and 
protected small island states in contexts where migration offers less risk 
than any outdated dependence on commodity trade. While migration 
may fracture families, a brain drain has become established. 
The combination of weak economies, overburdened bureaucracies, urban 
unemployment, fractured social networks and uneven development 
challenge notions of sustainable development. Small island states in the 
Pacific are likely to remain weak for the foreseeable future, become 
increasingly dependent on the wider world and require new forms of 
external support and intervention. 
Most Pacific SIDS have yet to develop policies for channeling remittances 
more effectively into development, but engagement with the globalising 
world through international migration has become a necessary and 
crucial means of linking into the benefits of globalisation and building 
economic resilience by a specific spatial form of diversification. 
References 
Abbott, D. and Pollard, S. (2004). Hardship and Poverty in the Pacific. 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Ahlburg, D. (1991). "Remittances and their Impact: A Study of Tonga 
and Western Samoa." Pacific Policy Papers, No. 7. Canberra: National 
Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University. 
Ahlburg, D. (1995). "Migration, Remittances and the Distribution of 
Income: Evidence from the Pacific," Asian and Pac(fic Migration Journal, 
Vol. 4: 157-168. 
Ahlburg, D. and Levin, M. (1990). The North East Passage: A Study of Pacific 
Islander Migration to American Samoa and the United States. Canberra, 
National Centre for Development Studies, Australian National University. 
283 
Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience 
Barker, J. (2000). "Hurricanes and Socio-economic Development on Niue 
Island," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 41: 191-205. 
Bertram, G. (1986). "Sustainable Development in South Pacific Micro 
Economies," World Development, Vol. 14: 809-822. 
Bertram, G. (1999). "The MIRAB Model Twelve Years On," The 
Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 11: 105-138. 
Bertram, G. (2006). "The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-first Century," 
Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 47: 1-14. 
Bertram, G. and Watters, R.F. (1985). "The MIRAB Economy in South 
Pacific Microstates," Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 26: 497-520. 
Borovnik, M. (2004). "Seafarer Remittances to Kiribati: Where do the 
Benefits Fall." Unpublished paper presented at the conference 
"Beyond MIRAB: the Political Economy of Small Islands in the 21st 
Century." Victoria University, Wellington. 
Brown, D. (2002). "The Weight of History: Some Recent Evidence of 
Chronic Poverty in Grenada." Unpublished paper. Available at 
http:/ /www.cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/ grenada/ conference/ 
papers/BrownD.html/. 
Brown, R. (1998). Do Pacific Island Migrants' Remittances Decline over 
Time? Evidence from Tongans and Western Samoans in Australia, 
The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 10: 107-151. 
Brown, R. and Connell, J. (1993). "The Global Flea Market: Migration, 
Remittances and the Informal Economy in Tonga," Development and 
Change, Vol. 24: 611-647. 
Brown, R. and Connell, J. (2004). "The Migration of Doctors and Nurses 
from South Pacific Island Nations," Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 
58: 2193-2210. 
Brown, R. and Connell, J. (2006). "Occupation-Specific Analysis of 
Migration and Remittance Behaviour: Pacific Island Nurses in 
Australia and New Zealand," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 47: 133-148. 
Brown, R. and Poirine, B. (2005). "A Model of Migrants' Remittances 
with Human Capital Investment and Intrafamilial Transfers," 
International Migration Review, Vol. 39: 407-438. 
Bryant, J. (1993). Urban Poverty and the Environment in the South Pacific. 
Armidale: University of New England. 
Carling, J. (2002). Cape Verde: Towards the End of Emigration? Migration 
Policy Institute, Washington. 
Chambers, K. and Chambers, A. (2001). Unity of Heart. Culture and Change 
in a Polynesian Atoll Society. Prospect Heights, Waveland Press. 
Chandra, D. (2003). "International Migration from Fiji: Gender and 
Human Development Issues," Asian and Pac!fic Migration Journal, Vol. 
13: 179-204. 
Connell, J. (1980). "Remittances and Rural Development: Migration, 
Dependency and Inequality in the South Pacific." National Centre for 
Development Studies Occasional Paper, No. 22. Canberra: ANU. 
284 
Poverty, Migration and Economic Resilience 
Connell, J. (1987). "Paradise Left? Pacific Island Voyagers in the Modern 
World." In Fawcett, J. and Carino, B. (eds), Pacific Bridges. The New 
Immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands. New York: Center for 
Migration Studies: 375-404. 
Connell, J. (1988). "The End Ever Nigh: Contemporary Population 
Changes on Pitcairn Island," Geo Journal, Vol. 16: 193-200. 
Connell, J. (1990). "The Carteret Islands: Precedents of the Greenhouse 
Effect," Geography, Vol. 75: 152-154. 
Connell, J. (2003a). "Regulation of Space in the Contemporary Post-
colonial Pacific City: Port Moresby and Suva," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 
Vol. 44: 243-258. 
Connell, J. (2003b). "Losing Ground? Tuvalu, the Greenhouse Effect and 
the Garbage Can," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 44: 89-107. 
Connell, J. (2004). "The Migration of Skilled Health Workers: from the 
Pacific Islands to the World," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 
13: 155-177. 
Connell, J. (2005). "A Nation in Decline? Migration and Emigration from 
the Cook Islands," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 14: 327-350. 
Connell, J. (2006a). "Migration, Dependency and Inequality in the Pacific: 
Old Wine in Bigger Bottles?" In Firth, S. (ed) Globalisation and 
Governance in the Pacific Islands. Canberra: Australian National 
University Press: 59-106. 
Connell, J. (2006b). "Saving the Solomons: a New Geopolitics in the Arc 
of Instability," Geographical Research, Vol. 44 (2): 111-122. 
Connell, J. (2007a). "Towards Free Trade in the Pacific? The Genesis of 
the Kava-Biscuit War between Fiji and Vanuatu," Geographical 
Research, Vol. 45: 1-12. 
Connell, J. (2007b). "Local Skills and Global Markets? The Migration of 
Health Workers from Caribbean and Pacific Island States," Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 56 (1/2): 67-95. 
Connell, J. (2007 c ). "At the End of the World. Holding on to Health Workers 
in Niue, Asian and Pacific," Migration Journal, Vol. 16: 179-198. 
Connell, J. (2007d). "Islands, Idylls and the Detours of Development," 
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Vol. 28: 116-135. 
Connell, J. (2008). "Niue: Embracing a Culture of Migration," Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies (in press). 
Connell, J. and Brown, R. (1995). "Migration and Remittances in the South 
Pacific: Towards New Perspectives," Asian and Pacific Migration 
Journal, Vol. 4: 1-33. 
Connell, J. and Brown, R. (2005). Remittances in the Pacific. An Overview. 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Connell, J. and Conway, D. (2000). "Migration and Remittances in Island 
Microstates: a Comparative Perspective on the South Pacific and the 
Caribbean," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 
24: 52-78. 
285 
Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience 
Connell, J. and King, R. (1999). "Island Migration in a Changing World." 
In King, R. and Connell, J. (eds), Small Worlds, Global Lives. Islands 
and Migration, London: Pinter: 1-26. 
Connell, J. and Lea, J. (2002). Urbanisation in the Island Pacific. London: 
Routledge. 
Connell, J. and Soutar, L. (2007). "Free Trade or Free Fall? Trade 
Liberalization and Development in the Pacific and Caribbean," Social 
and Economic Studies, Vol. 56 (1/2): 41-66. 
Connell, J. and Stilwell, B. (2006). "Merchants of Medical Care: Recruiting 
Agencies in the Global Health Care Chain." In Kuptsch, C. (ed), 
Merchants of Labour, Geneva: ILO: 239-253. 
Evans, M. (2001). Persistence of the Gift. Tongan Tradition in Transnational 
Context. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press. 
Faeamani, S. (1995). "The Impact of Remittances on Rural Development 
in Tongan Villages," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 4: 139-
156. 
Ferguson, J. (2003). Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic 
and Beyond. London: Minority Rights Group International. 
Florida, R. (2005). The Flight of the Creative Class. The New Global 
Competition for Talent. New York: Harper. 
Gailey, C.W. (1992a). "A Good Man is Hard to Find," Critique of 
Anthropology, Vol. 12: 47-74. 
Gailey, C.W. (1992b). "State Formation, Development and Social Change 
in Tonga." In Robillard, A. (ed), Social Change in the Pacific Islands. 
London: Kegan Paul International: 322-345. 
Halatuituia, S (2001). "Tonga's Contemporary Land Tenure System: 
Reality and Rhetoric." Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Sydney: University 
of Sydney. 
International Monetary Fund (2005). World Economic Outlook, April. 
Washington DC: IMF. 
James, K.E. (1991). "Migration and Remittances: A Tongan Village 
Perspective," Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 32: 1-23. 
James, K.E. (1993). "Cash and Kin. Aspects of Migration and Remittance 
from the Perspective of a Fishing Village in Vava'u, Tonga." In 
McCall, G. and Connell, J. (eds) A World Perspective on Pacific Islander 
Migration. University of New South Wales, Centre for South Pacific 
Studies Monograph No. 6, Sydney: 359-374. 
Koczberski, G., Curry, G. and Connell, J. (2001). "Full Circle or Spiralling 
out of Control? State Violence and the Control of Urbanisation in 
Papua New Guinea," Urban Studies, Vol. 38: 2017-2036. 
Levick, W. and Bedford, R. (1988). "Fiji Labour Migration to New Zealand 
in the 1980s," New Zealand Geographer, Vol. 44: 14-21. 
Macpherson, C. (1992). "Economic and Political Restructuring and the 
Sustainability of Migrant Remittances: The Case of Western Samoa/' 
The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 4: 109-136. 
286 
Poverty, Migration and Economic Resilience 
Macpherson, C. (2004). "Transnationalism and Transformation in 
Samoan Society." In Lockwood, V. (ed), Globalization and Culture 
Change in the Pacific Islands. New Jersey: Pearson: 165-181. 
Macpherson, C. and Macpherson, L. (1987). "Toward an Explanation of 
Recent Trends in Suicide in Western Samoa," Man, Vol. 22: 305-330. 
Marcus, G.E. (1981). "Power on the Extreme Periphery: The Perspective 
of Tongan Elites in the Modern World System," Pacific Viewpoint, 
Vol. 22: 48-64. 
Marcus, G.E. (1993). "Tonga's Contemporary Globalizing Strategies: 
Trading on Sovereignty Amidst International Migration." In 
Harding, T. and Wallace, B. (eds) Contemporary Pacific Societies. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 21-33. 
Mecartney, S. (2001). "Blacksands Settlement: Towards Urban Permanence 
in Vanuatu." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Sydney. 
Mitchell, J. (2000). "Violence as Continuity: Violence as Rupture. 
Narratives from an Urban Settlement in Vanuatu." In Dinnen, S. and 
Ley, A. (eds) Reflections on Violence in Melanesia. Sydney: Hawkins 
Press: 189-208 
Mitchell, J. (2004)." 'Killing Time' in a Postcolonial Town: Young People 
and Settlements in Port Vila, Vanuatu." In Lockwood, V. (ed), 
Globalization and Culture Change in the Pacific Islands. New Jersey: 
Pearson: 358-376. 
Morton, H. (1998). "Creating Their Own Culture: Diasporic Tongans," 
The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 10: 1-30. 
Morton, H. (1999). "Islanders in Space: Tongans Online." In King, R. 
and Connell, J. (eds), Small Worlds, Global Lives. Islands and Migration. 
London: Pinter: 235-253. 
Morton Lee, H. (2003). Tongans Overseas. Between Two Shores. Honolulu, 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Morton Lee, H. (2004). "All Tongans Are Connected: Tongan 
Transnationalism." In Lockwood, V. (ed), Globalization and Culture 
Change in the Pacific Islands. New Jersey: Pearson: 133-148. 
Muliaina, T. (2001). "Remittances, the Social System and Development 
in Samoa." In Naidu, V., Vasta, E. and Hawksley, C, (eds), Current 
Trends in South Pacific Migration. Asia Pacific Migration Research 
Network Working Paper No. 7, Centre for Asia Pacific Social 
Transformation Studies, Wollongong: 20-40. 
Narayan, P. and Smyth, R. (2003). "The Determinants of Emigration from 
Fiji to New Zealand," International Migration, Vol. 41: 33-58. 
Osborne, D. (2006). "The Archaeology of the Palau Islands." Bishop 
Museum Bulletin No. 230. Honolulu. 
Philpott, S. (1999). "The Breath of 'The Beast': Migration, Volcanic 
Disaster, Place and Identity in Montserrat." In King, R. and Connell, 
J. (eds), Small Worlds, Global Lives. Islands and Migration. London: 
Pinter: 137-159. 
287 
Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience 
Rokoduru, A. (2008). "Transient Greener pastures in Managed 
Temporary Labour Migration in the Pacific," In Connell, J. ( ed) The 
International Migration of Health Workers. London: Routledge: 171-
180. 
Royle, S. (2001). A Geography of Islands. London: Routledge. 
Scott, G. G. (2003). "Situating Fijian Transmigrants: Towards Racialised 
Transnational Social Spaces of the Undocumented," International 
Journal of Population Geography, Vol. 9: 181-198. 
Shankman, P. (1993). "The Samoan Exodus." In Lockwood, V., Wallace, 
B. and Harding, T. (eds), Contemporary Pacific Societies, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall: 156-170. 
Small, C. (1997). Voyages: From Tongan Villages to American Suburbs. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Underhill, Y. (1989). "Population Mobility as a Household Strategy: the 
Case of Manihiki Atoll, Cook Islands." Unpublished MA thesis, 
University of Hawaii, Honoluu. 
Voigt-Graf, C. (2003). "Fijian Teachers on the Move: Causes, Implications 
and Policies," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 44: 163-174. 
Voigt-Graf, C. and Connell, J. (2006). Towards Autonomy? Gendered 
Migration in Pacific Island Countries." In Ferro, K. and Wallner, M. 
(eds), Migration Happens. Reasons, Effects and Opportunities of Migration 
in the South Pacific, Vienna: Lit Verlag: 43-62. 
Walker, A and Brown, R. P. C. (1995). "From Consumption to Savings? 
Interpreting Tongan and Western Samoan Sample Survey Data on 
Remittances," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 4: 89-116. 
Ware, H (2005). "Demography, Migration and Conflict in the Pacific," 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42: 435-454. 
Winthorpe, M (2004). "Words from Whitesands: Reef Management in 
Tanna, Vanuatu." Unpublished B.Sc. Hons thesis, University of Sydney. 
World Bank (1998). Haiti: The Challenge of Poverty Reduction. Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
World Bank (2006). At Home and Away. Expanding Job Opportunities for 
Pacific Islanders through Labour Mobilitt;. Washington DC: World Bank 
288 
